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SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT FOR SAFETY-CRITICAL MEDICAL
APPLICATIONS
John C. Knight
ABSTRACT
There are many computer-based medical applications in which safety and not reliability
is the overriding concern. Reduced, altered, or no functionality of such systems is acceptable
as long as no harm is done. A precise, formal definition of what software safety means is
essential, however, before any attempt can be made to achieve it. Without this definition, it is
not possible to determine whether a specific software entity is safe. A set of definitions
pertaining to software safety will be presented and a case study involving an experimental
medical device will be described. Some new techniques aimed at improving software safety
will also be discussed,
BIOGRAPHY
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OUTLINE
What?
What Is Software Safety Exactly?
A Framework Of Def'mitions
Why?
Why Is Software Safety Important?
Who Should Care And Why Should They Care?
How?
How Can Software Safety Be Achieved?
What Process, Techniques, And Tools Are Needed?
What Questions Remain?
Case Study:
Evaluation Of Proposed Ideas
Safety-Critical, Medical Application
Research Status And Plans
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SOFTWARE SAFETY
Public Exposure To Digital Systems Increasing - Serious Problem
Several Standards Written Or Being Written, E.g. MoD Def. Std 0055
Lots Of Papers On Software Safety:
- Extremely Valuable And Important Contributions To The Topic
But, They Tend To Stress System Safety
Some Important Questions:
- Precisely When Should Software Be Considered Safe?
- What Is The Role And Responsibility Of The Software Engineer?
- What Is "Good Engineering Practice" In This Case?
- Exactly Who Has Legal Responsibility For What?
Distinguish Between Safety And Reliability, And Between Safety And Availability
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WHY IS PRECISION IMPORTANT?
• Concept Is Intuitive And Informal In General - I Know What It Means
• Something Is "Safe" If It Does No Harm - It Had Better Not Harm Me
Precise Framework Of Def'mitions Is Important For:
Software Engineers
Regulatory Agencies
Legal System
Me
Software Engineers Need To Know:
What Is Required Of Them, Why, And When
When Software Is "Good Enough"
Regulatory Agencies:
Responsibility To Protect The Public - FDA, FAA, Etc
Legal System:
- Apportioning Blame After An Accident
Med,_( fm_lwt_ Safe. =
®
\
UVA
Departmentof ComputerScience
/7
SOME TIME-HONORED ANECDOTES
Aircraft Landing Gear Raised While Aircraft On Ground:
Test Pilot Input During Ground Test, Aircraft Damaged
"Operational Profile or Specification In Error"
Computer Controlled Chemical Reactor Seriously Damaged:
Mechanical Alarm Signal Generated
Computer Kept All Controls Fixed - Reactor Overheated
"Systems Engineers Had Not Understood What Went On Inside The Computer"
F18 Missile Clamped To Wing After Engine Ignition:
Aircraft Out Of Control
"Erroneous Assumption Made About Time For Engine To Develop Full Thrust"
All Are Important, Very Serious Incidents - Valuable Insight Gained
What Exactly Is The Safety Issue In Each Case?
What Exactly Is The Responsibility Of The Software Engineer In Each Case.'?
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SYSTEM SAFETY
Informally, System Safety Is Subjective
Systems Engineers Have Formalized The Notion Of Safety:
Def'miti0ns - Hazard, Risk, Acceptable Level Of Risk, Safety
View System As Well-Defined Collection Of Components
Established Practices And Procedures
Software Researchers And Engineers Trying To Do The Same For Software
So Far, Success Is Limited
Within A System:
Software Is Merely Part Just Like Computer Hardware, Sensors, Actuators, Etc.
Software Can Cause Failure
Software Can Prevent Failure
Software Can Stand By And Watch Failure Happen
But So Can Any Other Part
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SOFTWARE SAFETY vs. SYSTEM SAFETY
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SYSTEM CONTEXT FOR SOFTWARE
• Common Observation - In Isolation, Software Is Never Unsafe:
True, It Cannot Be Executed In Isolation Either
Software Is Useless In Isolation
• Most Components In Any System Axe Safe In Isolation
• In Isolation, Software Is Removed From The Notion Of Hazard:
This Does Not Imply That Software Safety Is Meaningful Only In The
Context Of The Entire System
• Software Engineers Axe Not Qualified To Deal With Systems Engineering Issues
• Do We Want The Software Engineer:
Deciding Actinn For Unspecified Input7
Implementing Functionality That "Seems Right' '?
• Hazards, Risks, Etc. Should Not Appear In The Software Specification
• The Required Treatment Of Hazard Must Be Present In The Software Specification
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fTHE ANECDOTES AGAIN
Aircraft Landing Gear Raised While Aircraft On Ground:
- "Operational Profile or Specification In Error"
- Systems Engineer's Responsibility
Computer Controlled Chemical Reactor Seriously Damaged:
"Systems Engineers Had Not Understood What Went On Inside The Computer"
Systems Engineer's Responsibility
F18 Missile Clamped To Wing After Engine Ignition:
"Erroneous Assumption Made About Time For Engine To Develop Full Thrust"
Probably The Systems Engineer's Responsibility
In General, Software Engineer Is Not Trained To Identify Hazards, Consider:
Computerized Flight-Control System Commands Aircraft To Flare On
Final Approach At Air Speed Of 128 Knots, Height 180 Feet, 15 Knot
Headwind, Throttles At 75%, MI._ On, Fuel At 14%, 1,027 Feet From
Runway Touchdown Point, Undercarriage Down, Flaps At 30%
• Is This A Hazard?
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A FRAMEWORK OF DEFINITIONS
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Definition Component Intrinsic Functionality Specifications
The Required Functionality Of The Component Without Regard To Safety
Definition - Component Failure Interface Specifications
The Required Functionafity That Must Be Provided In The Event That
The Component Is Unable To Provide Its Intrinsic Functionality
Definition - Component Recovery Functionality Specifications
The Required Functionality That Must Be Provided In The Event That
One Or More Other Component Fail
Definition Component Safety Specifications
The Component Failure Interface Specifications Combined With The
Component Recovery Functionality Specifications
Definition - Software Safety
Software Is Safe If It Complies With Its Component Safety Specifications
uvADepartment of Comouter Sc,e_ce
.J
/
f
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
SPECIFICATIONS
Functional I i_''" ................... .'''i
_ Implementation _
_ Specification // 1 SpecificatiOnError
_ .....................................Hazard Analysis "lil ////_
Software
/
Implementation
Error
[_ UVA ._Department of Computer Sctence
SOFTWARE SAFETY
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Software
Software Is Safe To The Extent That It Complies With Its Safety Specification
Safe Software Might Fail - That Is A Subjective Issue, Formally It Was Safe
Software Engineer's Task Now Clear
Responsibility For Accidents Can Be Fairly Assigned
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FORMAL PLACEMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY
Applications Engineer
Risks
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A CASE STUDY
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Is This Conceptual Framework Useful? If Not Why Not?
If Useful, How Can Safe Software Be Built And Demonstrated?
Approach:
Case Study Based On Safety-Critical Application
"Gloves Off", No _,ssumptions, Not An Academic Study, Do It Right Or Else
Magnetic Stereotaxis System (Video Tumour Fighter):
Experimental Device For Human Neurosurgery
Complex Physical System, Clearly Safety-Critical
Stringent Safety Requirements
- Minimal Reliability And Availability Requirements
Primary Safety Issues:
- Patient Safety
- Equipment Safety
I
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MAGNETIC STEREOTAXIS SYSTEM - CONCEPT
Permanent Magnet (Seed) Electromagnet
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MAGNETIC STEREOTAXIS SYSTEM
................................................. j
Radio Frequ. System
Cryogenic System
m Coil Control System
m X-Ray Imaging System
Operator Display 1
Supercon
X-Ray Source
\
\
R.F. Heating Coil
Patient Therapy Region
-_ Computer Control System
M.R. Images, Patient EtcData,
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SOME OF THE MSS/VTF SAFETY ISSUES
External Superconducting Coils:
- Incorrect Current Calculated By Software And Applied
- Coil(s) Fail, Incorrect Coil Shutdown Effected
- Coil Controller(s) Fail, Incorrect Coil Shutdown Effected
Signals Scrambled Between Computer And Coil Controller(s)
X-Ray Subsystem:
Hardware Fails On When Supposed To Be Off Or Vice Versa
Software Commands On Incorrectly
Image Defects - Ghost, Incorrect, Or "Old" Image Used
Incorrect Target Identification - Marker Rather Than Seed
Radio Frequency System:
Hardware Fails On When Supposed To Be Off Or Vice Versa
Software Commands On Incorrectly
Wrong Power Level Administered
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MORE OF THE MSS/VTF SAFETY ISSUES
Display System:
- Wrong Seed Location Shown On Magnetic-Resonance Image
- Wrong Magnetic-Resonance Image Displayed
- Other Incorrect Data Displayed
Operator Error:
- Commands Erroneous Movement
- Fails To Observe Error Message
Software System:
- File System Supplied Erroneous Information
- Interference From Non-Safety-Critical Elements
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DEVELOPING SAFE SOFTWARE
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Framework Of Dermitions Is First Step:
Now We Know What We Have To Achieve
Safe Software Is Well-Defmed Target
Also Know Who IsFormally Responsible For What
How Is Safe Software Developed?
There Is No Magic Bullet Is Specified Verification Level Is Very High
For Safety-Critical Software:
- No Dependable Technology Exists
- Many Open Research Areas
- Safety Is "Simpler" Than Reliability, In Many Cases More Important
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System
Fault Tree Analysis
Tools
Formal
Specification
PROCESS SUMMARY
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SYSTEM FAULT TREES
Patient Injury
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Injured By Seed Injured By X Ray Injured By RF Injured By Operator
Seed Moves At Wrong Time
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Incorrect Movement Commanded
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Emergency Shutdown System Fails Superconducting System Fails Operator Error
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SYSTEM FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
• System Fault Trees Are:
- Large And Complex
Very Hard To Get Right
Involve Software In Two Distinct Ways - Software Failure And Software Response
• Tools Needed To:
Manipulate Fault Trees To Facilitate Software Analysis
Permit Rigorous Software Safety Requirements Process
Enable Assurance Of Adequate Coverage By Software
Permit Formal Software Safety Specifications To Be Derived
• Tools Concepts:
Build Hardware-Only Fault Trees
Display, Inspect, Analyze Probabilities, Etc
Add Functional Software Nodes
Mechanically Derive Software Failure Cases And Required Software Responses
Assist With Derivation Of Specifications And Various Property Proofs
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SAFETY KERNEL CONCEPTS
Verifying Safety Properties Is The Single Design Constraint
Application Services
Display Control ]
Equipment Interlocks
Periodic Events ]
Duration Control J
Real-Time Monitoring
Soft Shutdown
Hard Shutdown
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CASE STUDY EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH
• Develop System Fault Tree And Software Specifications (Drafts Completed)
- Specifications Presently Written In 'Z' (Draft Completed)
- Safety Specification Delimited
• Implement Complete, Non-Safe Prototype System Based On UNIX And X
• Add Facilities And Transition To:
- Safety Kernel On Bare Hardware
Progressively "Safer" System
• Verify Safety Properties:
Exhaustive Testing - Carefully Avoiding Butler & Finelli's Result
Formal Proofs Where Possible
Rigorous Argument, Static Analysis, Inspection
• Goal - Repeatable, Dependable Process Providing Assured Software Safety
• Also, A Process That Has Been Evaluated
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SUMMARY
"lnvasive" Computer-Controlled Medical Devices Becoming More Common
Serious Safety Requirements, Often Very Limited Reliability And Availability Needed
Technology To Deliver Software Safety Is Elusive
Formalization Of The Meaning Of Terms And The Role Of The Software Engineer
Software Engineer Is Not Qualified For Anything But Software Engineering
Case Study Being Undertaken To:
Evaluate Definitions, Process Concepts, Tools, Techniques
Demonstrate Workable Process With Realistic Example
Support The MSS Project
UVADepartment of Computer Soence
-....J
